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STATE OF UTAH 
EDWARD EARL PASS, 
Plaintt"f f-A ppellant, 
vs. Case No. 
JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, Utah 11729 
State Prison, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The appellant, Edward Earl Pass, is appealing from 
a denial of his petition for writ of habews corpus in the 
Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Millard County, 
the Honorable C. Nelson Day, Presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Honorable C. Nelson Day, after a full hearing, 
rnled that Edward Earl Pass's petition for writ of habeas 
corpus "hould be denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent suLmits that the denial for writ of habeas 
rn1·pus by Judge Day should be affirmed. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Edward Earl Pass was arrested on or about January 
15, 1968 ( T. 59, 60), and was subsequently charged with 
the first degree murder of Jack Stokes (Record 3). On 
March 12, 1968, Edward Earl Pass, with counsel, entered 
a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea to second degree 
murder (Guilty plea trans. 2, 3). Mr. Pass was then sen-
tenced to the Utah State Prison for a term not less than 
ten yearn and which may be for life (Sentencing trans. 3). 
On February 14, 1969, and May 2, 1969, in the F,ifth Judi-
cial District, Mr. Pass had a full hearing at which his peti-
tion for habeas corpus was denied. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
APPELLANT GAVE A VOLUNTARY, INTEL-
LIGENT AND UNDERSTANDING GUILTY 
PLEA. 
The United States Supreme Court in Boykin v. Ala-
bama, 395 U. S. 238 (1969) and McCarthy v. United States, 
394 U. S. 459 (1968) set down certain guidelines for a 
judge in accepting a guilty plea. Appellant contends that 
these guidelines (ri. e., that the guilty plea must be intelli-
gently and knowingly given, and the defendant must know 
the nature of the charges against him) were not followed 
in this particular case and therefore his constitutional 
nights were violated. However, the transcript clearly in-
dicates that Pass's guilty plea was intelligently and know-
ingly given and that he was completely aware of the 
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charges against him. The amended information was read 
to Mr. Pass and then the following took place: 
"THE COURT: Mr. Edward Earl Pass, what 
is your plea to the amended information just read 
to you and which charges you with the felony of 
murder in the i:second degree; are you guilty or are 
you not guilty? 
"EDWARD EARL PASS: Guilty. 
"THE COURT: And by that plea of guilty, 
am I to understand that you did, on or about the 
15th day of January, 1968, and in Mtillard County, 
Utah, willfully and maliciously murder one Jack 
WiUiam Stokes, also known as Jack Pitts? 
"EDWARD EARL PASS: Yes, your Honor. 
"THE COURT: Do I understand further that 
you enter tMs plea of guilty to the amended infor-
mation after you have conferred at length with Mr. 
Waddingham? 
"EDWARD EARL PASS: Yes, sir. 
"THE COURT: And you know what the pen-
alty is and what the charge against you is? 
"EDWARD EARL PASS: Yes, I have been 
advised. 
"THE COURT: Mr. Pass, you know, at least 
I assume you know, that we are prepared to go 
ahead with your trial this morning on the matter 
and submit the matter to a jury? 
"EDWARD EARL PASS: Yes, sir. 
"THE COURT: But it was with your consent, 
was it, that the trial has been called off and you 
now enter this plea? 
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"EDWARD EARL PASS: Yes, sir. 
"THE COURT: Has any duress or menace or 
undue influence of any kind been used -
"EDWARD EARL PASS: No, sir. 
"THE COURT: - in this regard and with 
regard to your plea'? 
"EDWARD EARL PASS: No, sir. 
"THE COURT: Has any promise or offer of 
leniency or reward, or anything like that, been made 
to you? 
"EDWARD EARL PASS: No, sir, your Honor, 
been no promi'Ses made. 
"THE COURT: All right. Your plea of guilty 
will be entered in this matter, and your plea of not 
guilty as to the original information is ordered with-
drawn. We will pass that, then. Mr. Waddingham, 
as you know, the statute provides sentence is not 
to be imposed for at least two days." (Guilty plea 
Trans. 2, 3, 4). 
The above transcript clearly indicates that Past.S volun-
tarily and intelligently, with the advice of counsel, pleaded 
guilty to the crime charged. Note that the court directed 
its questions to Mr. Pass, not his attorney, and asked him 
specific points to insure that his guilty plea was knowingly, 
voluntarily and intelligently given. 
The transcript clearly indicates Pasis's complete aware-
ness of his guilty plea. But besides what Pass himself tes-
tified to, his lawyer testified that he left Pas•s a copy of 
the Utah Code Ann. ( 1953) section on homicides, so PatSs 
could study the law himself (T. 70, 71). Thus, Pass had 
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a copy of the Utah Code Ann. (1953) relating to the 
charges against him, and a capable lawyer for adv;ice, be-
fo1·e he went in court to plead guilty to second degree mur-
der. On this basis there is no doubt that Pass knew exactly 
what he was d<Ying and the consequences thereof when he 
pleaded guilty. 
POINT II. 
APPELLANT WAIVED ALL NON-JURISDIC-
TIONAL DEFENSES WHEN HE MADE A 
VOLUNTARY AND INTELLIGENT GUILTY 
PLEA. 
Appellant contends in his brief that some evidence was 
illegally seized. What appellant overlooked was that a 
guilty plea like hls own specifically waives the right to 
object to an illegal search and seizure or any other non-
jurisdictional defect. 
This year the Supreme Court of the United States 
held: 
"Because guilty plea is a waiver of trial and, 
unless appldcable law otherwise provides, a waiver 
of right to consent admissibility of any evidence 
state might have offered against defendant, guilty 
plea must be an intelligent act done with sufficient 
awareness of relevant circumstances and con-
sequences." McMann v. Richardson, ______ U. S. ______ , 
90 S. Ct. 1441, at 1446 (1970). (Emphasis added.) 
In Utah there is no other applicable law and of course, 
t!ie Supreme Court deciis,ion is binding - a gu1lty plea 
waives all rights of defendant to consent to admissibility 
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of evidence that is against him. This decision specifically 
prohibits Pass from alleging the evidence was illegally 
seized, because of his guilty plea, he waived the right of 
prohibiting evidence 'in court. 
Other federal courts, including the Tenth Circuit, ad-
here to the same principle. Note the following language 
taken from Benton v. United States, 352 F. 2d 59 (10th 
Cir. 1965), wherein the defendant alleged that there was 
an illegal search and seizure, coercion, and illegal confes-
sion. 
"In view of the allegation of fact made by ap-
pellant on this appeal with respect to the search 
and seizure, the coercion, and the confession issues, 
we agree with appellee that appellant's plea of 
guilty prevents any consideration thereof on this 
point." Id. at 60. 
In another Tenth Circuit case, Lattin v. Cox, 355 F. 
2d 397 (10th Cir. 1966), the appellant (appeal from denial 
of his habeas corpus petition) presented as one of his issues 
that evidence was taken through an illegal search and seiz· 
ure. The court held : 
"After a careful consideration of the entire 
record before us, we must conclude that the pleas 
of guilty entered by Lattin in the state court to the 
charges of involuntary manslaughter and rape were 
voluntary and understandingly made and were not 
induced by any promises or threats. Such pleas of 
guilty waived all non-jurisdictional defects in pro-
ceedings had prfor thereto." Id. at 400. 
State court precedence is air.so in accord. The Supreme 
Court of Arizona in State v. Martinez, 102 Ariz. 215, 427 
7 
P. 2cl 533 (1967) states the following: 
"We find no validity in this argument for none 
of the matters complained of by defendant attacks 
any jurisdictional defect in the proceedings and lit 
is a well established rule of law that when a defen-
dant voluntarily and knowingly pleads guilty at his 
trial such constitutes a waiver of non-jurisdictional 
defenses, defects and irregularities." Id. at 534. 
From these cases it is clear that a guilty plea similar 
to the one appellant made, which is voluntarily and know-
ingly given, waives all non-jurisdictional defects, including 
illegal search and seizure. 
POINT III. 
COUNSEL PROVIDED FOR APPELLANT AT 
HIS ORIGINAL TRIAL WAS EFFECTIVE AND 
OOMPETENT AND DID NOT CONSTITUTE A 
DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTION-
AL RIGHTS. 
Appellant tr:ies to attack his counsel at the original 
trial claiming he wa:s deprived of eff ecti.ve aid and assist-
ance by counsel in deciding whether or not to plead guilty. 
Counsel for appellant was and is a well known and re-
spected attorney. Mr. Burns, the attorney prosecuting 
Pass, testif1ied that Mr. Waddingham (Pass's counsel) was 
very thorough in his examination, research and presenta-
tion of the law (T. 134). Mr. Waddingham, acting as 
court-appointed counsel, advised Pass to the best of his 
ability. Even the Supreme Court of the United States re-
alizes how hard it ,is to advise your client whether or not 
to i1Iead guilty. 
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"But because of inherent uncertainty in guilty 
plea advice ... " McMann v. Richardson, ______ U. S. 
______ , 90 S. Ct. 1441, 1449 (1970). 
"Considerations like these (whether or not to 
plead guilty) frequently present imponderable ques-
tions for which there are no certain arnswers; judg. 
ments may be made which in the light of later 
events seems improvident, although they were per-
fectly sensible at the time." Brady v. United States, 
______ U. S. ______ , 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1473 (1970). 
The court, in Grubbs v. State, Okl. Cr., 397 P. 2d 522 
( 1969), held: 
"Petitioner was not entitled to a writ of habeas 
corpus, where an allegation that court-appointed 
counsel was incompetent and not supported, and 
court-appointed counsel was a duly licensed member 
of the bar and was qualified by training and ex-
perience to protect the rights of an accused in crim-
inal proceedings." Id. at 522. 
Arizona and California allow a contention of depriva-
tion of adequate counsel to be asserted in habeas corpus 
proceedings only in extreme cases where the trial was a 
farce or a sham. 
"If appellant sets forth no facts which indicate 
the appointed attorney's performance was !SO sub-
standard as to render the trial a farce or sham, the 
petition 1is properly denied." Baron v. State, 7 Ariz. 
App. 223, 437 P. 2d 975, 977 (1968). 
"To justify relief on ground that counsel was 
inadequate, it must appear that trial was reduced 
to farce or sham through attorney's lack of compe-
tence, diligence or knowledge of law." In re Beaty, 
51 Cal. Rptr. 521, 64 C. 2d 760, 414 P. 2d 817, 819 
(1966). 
See also McGree v. Crouse, 190 Kan. 615, 376 P. 2d 
792 (1962) and Gresham v. Page, Oki. Cr., 441 P. 2d 478 
(1968), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 916 (1968). 
None of the allegations made by appellant can be 
proven. In fact, most the eviidence relating to this issue 
indicates Mr. Waddingham is a competent attorney who 
spent a great deal of time and effort on behalf of his dient, 
Mr. Pass. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner Edward Earl Pass entered an iintelligent, 
knowing, and voluntary guilty plea and based on cases 
cited, that plea prohioits him from alleging his constitu-
tional rights were violated. Respondent prays that the 
lower court order denying the petition for habeas corpus 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
LAUREN N. BEASLEY 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
